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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant appeals from the final judgment issued by the Seventh District Court
("District Court") on December 12, 2014. 1 The Supreme Court of Utah transferred this
i.iJ

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on January 5, 2015. The Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-l 03(2)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue No. 1: Whether the District Court erred by making certain findings of fact that are

directly contravened by the record and trial testimony.
Determinative Law: Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d
645; IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607 (Utah 1989).
Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 1 36, 326
P.3d 645; Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Wareshouse, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Preserved at: [R. 546-551].
Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Water Use Authorization

("WUA"), standing alone, fails to establish an enforceable written contract or that
Brasher accepted Christensen's offer to lease water as a matter of law.
Determinative Law: Uhrhahn Constr. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App
41, 179 P .3d 808; McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126, 211 P .3d 390; Aquagen

Int'/, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411 (Utah 1998).

1

Brasher is the Appellant in this appeal and Plaintiff in the District Court case.
Christensen is the Appellee in this appeal and Defendant in the District Court case.
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Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous. Uhrhahn Constr. & Design, Inc. v.
Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, 179 P.3d 808.

Preserved at: [R. 112-154; 176-195; 529-531; 550-551].
Issue No. 3: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that there was no meeting of
the minds between Christensen and Brasher as to the essential elements necessary to form
an oral contract.
Determinative Law:

Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);

Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Prince, Yeates
& Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179.

Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 265-67
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Preserved at: [R. 112-154; 176-195; 531-532; 550-551].
Issue No. 4: Whether the District Court erred in finding that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was inapplicable because the District Court found that Brasher's use of
Christensen's water was conditioned upon Brasher's purchase of Christensen's Farm.
Determinative Law: Stangl v. Ernst Home Ctr., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App.
1997); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103
(Utah 1987); Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980);
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 1088; Nunley v. Westates
Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100,989 P.2d 1077.

Standard of Review: Correctness. Stangl v. Ernst Home Ctr., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997).
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Preserved at: [R. 531-532; 550-551 ].
Issue No. 5: Whether the District Court erred in failing to apply the parol evidence rule
to certain extrinsic evidence.
Determinative Law: DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 2009 UT App 269, 220 P.3d
178; Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326; Daines v. Vincent,
2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269.
Standard of Review: Correctness. DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 2009 UT App
269, 17,220 P.3d 178.
Preserved at: [R. 120; 337-339; 392-393].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case was filed by Brasher against Christensen and was heard in the Seventh
District Court ("District Court").
Brasher lacked sufficient water access to sustain his alfalfa crops and cows. In
order to cover his water needs, Brasher contacted Christensen to see if he could lease
some of her water. Christensen leased 215 shares of class "A" water to Brasher during the
year 2012 pursuant to a "Water Use Authorization" ("WUA") form provided by
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC"). Christensen and Brasher executed
the exact same form WU A in 2013 for the same number of shares at the same price but
for a duration of six years (instead of one year) during a meeting on March 13, 2013. At
~

the meeting, Brasher tendered a check for the 2013 WU A in the same amount as the
previous 2012 year. Christensen accepted the payment.
Page 3 of 45

Christensen and Brasher had also previously discussed the possibility of Brasher
purchasing Christensen's property along with all of her water shares. An Offer to
Purchase Real Estate Form ("Offer to Purchase") for the purchase of Christensen's
property was executed by Christensen and Brasher at the March 13, 2013 meeting.
Among other things, the Offer to Purchase indicated that Christensen was required to
accept or reject the offer by March 2013. Although the Offer to Purchase required
Brasher to pay $5,000.00 in earnest money, Brasher did not tender payment of the earnest
money because Christensen indicated that she wanted to speak with her family and her
attorney about the Offer to Purchase before making any final decisions.
After leaving the March 13, 2013 meeting, Brasher filed the 2013 WUA with
HCIC the same day. Brasher began calling for use of the water in early April, 2013.
During weeks following the March 13, 2013 meeting, Brasher made multiple
attempts to contact Christensen to arrange for delivery of the earnest money. Also,
because the Offer to Purchase indicated that Brasher was to take possession of
Christensen's Farm (but not her house), Brasher wanted to ensure that everything was
prepared. Brasher finally reached Christensen on March 24, 2013. During the course of
the conversation, Christensen revealed that she had not notified Wayne Gordon (who had
been grazing cattle on Christensen's land) that Brasher was to take possession of the
Farm the following day. Christensen had privately already decided that she was not going
to sell the Farm to Brasher under the terms set forth in the Offer to Purchase-but she did
not tell Brasher this during the March 24, 2013 telephone call. Based on Christensen's

Page 4 of 45

G

failure to notify Wayne Gordon of the impending sale, Brasher assumed that the Offer to
Purchase had been rejected.
Near the end of April, 2013, Christensen's real estate agent, Karen Martino-Basso
~

contacted Brasher and indicated that Christensen had decided to raise the price of the
Farm $100,000 and keep 100 shares of water. Sometime near the end of April, 2013 or
the beginning of May 2013, HCIC contacted Christensen regarding Brasher's use of her
water. Christensen never contacted Brasher to notify him directly that she was canceling
the WUA. Instead Christensen submitted a Notice of Termination Water Use

VIP

Authorization ("Notice of Termination) terminating Brasher's use of the water. The
Notice of Termination was dated May 29, 2013-approximately ten weeks from the
execution and filing of the WUA and approximately two months after Brasher had
commenced using the water. As a result of this termination, Brasher suffered crop loss
and was ultimately forced to sell all of his cattle.
Christensen subsequently asserted that her agreement to lease the water under the
2013 WUA was conditioned specifically upon Brasher purchasing her property. Because
Brasher did not purchase her property, Christensen believed she was justified in
terminating the 2013 WU A.
This case requires the Court to determine: ( 1) whether the District Court erred in
issuing certain findings of fact that are not supported by the record and trial testimony;
(2) whether the District Court erred in determining that the 2013 WUA, by itself, is not a
contract; (3) whether the District Court erred in concluding that Christensen and Brasher
did not enter into an underlying oral agreement concerning the lease of the 215 water
Page 5 of 45

shares in 2013; (4) whether the District Court erred in ruling that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was inapplicable and (5) whether the District Court erred in refusing
to preclude the admission of certain evidence based on the parol evidence rule.
Course of Proceedings
Brasher filed the Complaint on May 28, 2013. The Complaint alleges four causes
of action: ( 1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
(3) promissory estoppel, and (4) declaratory relief. [R. 001-005]. Christensen filed an
Answer on June 24, 2013. [R. 067-071].
On August 20, 2013, Brasher filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
accompanying Memorandum. [R. 109-154]. After the parties submitted their respective
replies, the District Court issued a ruling denying the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. [R. 199-201].
A bench trial was conducted on July 10, 2014.
Disposition at Trial
The District Court judge issued its Memorandum Decision on September 17, 2014.
[R. 526-533]. A final Order incorporating findings of fact and conclusions of law was
signed by the District Court on December 12, 2014. [R. 546-551]. The District Court's
ruling in favor of Christensen essentially relied upon three legal conclusions:
1.

The WUA, by itself, does not establish an enforceable contract; nor does it
establish that Christensen accepted Brasher's offer to lease water to Brasher, as a
matter of law. The WUA, by its very terms, indicates that it is made "[i]n
accordance with a lease and/or agreement." Accordingly, the WUA contemplates
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that the parties have reached a separate agreement as to the lease of shares of
HCIC stock, and the WUA instructs HCIC to deliver water to one of the parties for
a period of time.
2.

Brasher has the burden to prove the existence of an oral contract. Whether an oral
contract was established turns upon whether there was a meeting of the minds as
to each element of the contract. Based on the [purely extrinsic] evidence presented
at trial, Christensen believed the water lease was part of the Farm sale. Therefore,
there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. Christensen did not intend
to lease the water to Brasher unless purchased the Farm-thus no oral contract
existed.

3.

Brasher's claim for promissory estoppel is inapplicable because Christensen's
promise to allow Brasher to draw water in 2013 was conditioned upon Brasher
purchasing the Farm. [R. 550-551].

v8

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Christensen is the owner of 260 acres of real property ("the Farm"), a house, and
certain rights to use irrigation water in Emery County, Utah. [R. 546]

~

2.

The irrigation water is represented by shares of stock in HCIC. [R. 546].

3.

At issue in the instant matter are 605.55 shares of HCIC water classified as "A"

~

water, and 175 shares of water classified as "B" water. [R. 546].
4.
·~

Brasher owns, or leases, approximately 100 acres of ground in Emery County
which he purchased in 2009. [R. 547]. [TT. 117:7-9].

Page 7 of 45

5.

On his land, Brasher Farms 60 acres of irrigated pasture, and 30 acres of irrigated
alfalfa. [R. 547].

6.

Further, Brasher also owns 15 shares of "A" water stock in the HCIC, and 90
shares of "B" water stock in HCIC. This ownership allows Brasher to irrigate
approximately 45 acres of his ground. [R. 547].

7.

Typically, Brasher must lease enough additional water each year to irrigate the
remaining 55 acres Farmed by Brasher each year. [R. 547].

8.

Brasher purchased 20 head of cattle in November 2010, to raise on the ground
Brasher owned. [R. 54 7].

9.

Brasher uses the irrigated pasture and the alfalfa he grows on his property to feed
his cattle. [R. 54 7].

10.

HCIC requires people who lease water from HCIC shareholders to provide HCIC
with an executed WUA form. HCIC provides only a single form to its users. [R.
547].
The WUA instructs HCIC to deliver shareholder water to a designated third party.
[R. 547].

11.

Basher initially leased the 215 shares of "A" water from Christensen in the year
2012. [TT. 14:21-24].

12.

Brasher's lease of the 215 shares of"A" water in 2012 was memorialized solely
and exclusively by using HCIC's WUA form as is the typical custom in the area.
[R. 547]. [A copy of the 2012 WUA is attached as Addendum I].
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13.
~

The 2012 WUA between Christensen and Brasher directed HCIC to deliver to
Brasher 215 shares of Class "A" water held by Christensen. [R. 547-A]. 2

14.

The 2012 WUA begins with the language "In accordance with a lease and/or other
agreement ... " [See 2012 WUA, Addendum 1].

~

15.

Christensen testified at trial that the 2012 WUA was not contingent upon any real
estate offer to purchase Christensen's Farm or any other associated agreement.
[TT. 15:4-20]. According to Christensen, "I just rented [the 215 shares] because I
had extra water." [TT. 15: 10-11].

~

16.

The 2012 WUA was accompanied by a check for $1,290.00, signifying a full,
premium, payment for the water lease, which Christensen cashed. [R. 547-A]. [A
copy of the Check 1073 dated 4/22/12 for the amount of $1,290.00 is attached as
Addendum 2].

17.
;JJ

Based on the 2012 WUA, HCIC delivered water to Brasher for the water year
2012. [R. 547-A].

18.

Brasher used the 215 shares of "A" water from April, 2012 through the end of the
water year, October 31, 2012. [R. 547].

i.do

19.

The language found in the 2012 WUA, and the 2013 WUA are identical. [A copy
of the 2013 WUA is attached as Addendum 3].

2

In preparing the Record, the District Court failed to Bates-stamp the third page of the
final Order. The second page is Bates-stamped as "547" and the fourth page is Batesstamped as "548." Accordingly, the intervening third page of the Order is designated as
page "547-A" of the Record in this Brief.
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20.

In February 2013, Brasher initiated contact with Christensen to inquire about
leasing Christensen's water for 2013 just as Brasher had done in 2012. [R. 547-A].

21.

Christensen initially rejected Brasher's request. [R. 547-A].

22.

A short time later, Brasher decided to inquire of Christensen again and called
Christensen a second time. [R. 547-A].

23.

This time Christensen replied she did not know if her water was going to be
available for lease in 2013. [R. 547-A].

24.

Brasher following up on this change in Christensen's position, called a third time
shortly after the second call to see if the water was going to be available. [R. 54 7A].

25.

Christensen told Brasher she still wanted to "wait and see." [R. 547-A].

26.

However, prior to the March 13, 2013 meeting, Christensen never stated that she
would not lease the water on the basis that she wanted to sell her Farm. [TT.
134: 13-15].

27.

Following yet another conversation, Brasher reached out on March 10, 2013. [R.
547-A].

28.

Importantly, prior to the March 13, 2013 meeting, Christensen never indicated or
stated that she would not lease the water because she wanted to sell her Farm. [TT.
134: 13-15].

29.

During the March 10, 2014 call, Brasher arranged to meet Christensen on March
13, 2013 at Christensen's house. [R. 547-A].
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30.

During the telephone conversation setting up the March 13, 2013 meeting, Brasher
indicated that, in addition to leasing the water, he had some interest in actually
purchasing Christensen's Farm. [R. 548].

~

31.

Christensen responded that she would consider selling, but that any real estate
purchase offer would not be final until she reviewed it and took it to her attorney.
[TT. 215: 19-22; 216:6-9].

32.

Brasher told Christensen that he had $5,000.00 earnest money to give Christensen
in an effort to advance a purchase of the Farm. [R. 548].

~

33.

The March 13, 2013 meeting at Christensen's home was attended by Brasher,
Christensen, and Nedra Swasey ("Swasey") (a friend of Christensen's). [R. 548].

34.

Brasher brought a blank WUA form from HCIC and a blank "Offer to Purchase
Real Estate Form" ("Offer to Purchase") to the March 13 meeting. [R. 548].

35.
:.iii

Brasher and Christensen negotiated relative to the sale of the Farm and Swasey
filled out the Offer to Purchase accordingly. [R. 548].

36.

Brasher and Christensen also discussed the need to provide some advance notice
to Wayne Gordon (who had been pasturing cows on Christensen's property) that

~

he would have to remove his cows if the Offer to Purchase was accepted. [TT.
112: 15 through 1 13 :7].
37.

Brasher also explained to Christensen that if Christensen did not lease the 215
irrigation shares, his pasture would bum up and he would not have "anywhere to
go" with his cows. [TT. 111 :2-7].
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38.

The Offer to Purchase was signed by the parties at the March 13, 2013 meeting.
[A copy of the March 13, 2013 Offer to Purchase Real Estate is attached as
Addendum 4]. With respect to the Offer to Purchase, the following facts are
relevant:
a.

The amount of $475,000 is indicated as the total purchase price;

b.

$5,000 of the total purchase price was to be deposited as earnest money;

C.

The Offer to Purchase does not specify any date by which earnest money
was required to be paid;

d.

Importantly, the Closing for the sale was to occur on or before December 1,

e.

The Offer was to remain open until March 2013. If not accepted by the
Owner [Christensen] by this time, the Offer was to be rescinded and any
earnest money returned;

f.

Brasher was to take possession of the "Farm" (but not the house on the
Farm) on March 25, 2103. Christensen was to maintain possession of the
home until April 2, 2014.

g.

The sale includes: all mineral and gas and oil rights, approximately 260
acres of land, 605.55 shares of class "A" water and 175 shares of class "B"
water, BLM permits, miscellaneous Farm equipment (excluding several
enumerated items).

39.

Brasher did not pay the earnest money to Christensen at the March 13, 2013
meeting. [R. 548]. Brasher planned on paying Christensen at the meeting, but
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Christensen said that she wanted to speak with her family and attorney about the
Offer to Purchase before accepting payment of the earnest money. [TT. 91:1-3].
40.

Next, Brasher filled out the 2013 WUA himself. The terms "payable 3/15 each
year" was not filled in at the March 13th meeting, nor was the term "2018." [R.

v/J

548]. (This finding of fact is challenged in Section I of the Argument).
41.

During the March 13, 2013 meeting, Brasher explained that he needed to lease the
water for at least five years in order to have the National Conservation Resource
Service approve his use of sprinklers on his property. [TT. 83: 18 through 84:6].

~

42.

Brasher testified that during the March 13, 2013 meeting, he witnessed
Christensen write in the WUA's ending term of"2018" as presently seen to exist
on the 2013 WUA. [TT. 227:4 through 227:11; 227:22 through 228:7].

43.

Christensen testified that she didn't recall much of any real discussion about the
WUA during the March 13, 2013 meeting. [TT. 217:3-5].

44.

Christensen told Brasher at this time that the water would only be leased to him on
a year to year basis. [R. 548]. {This finding of fact is challenged in Section I of the
Argument).

45.

Both parties signed the WUA, and the Offer to Purchase. Christensen then
informed Brasher that she needed to discuss both offers with her family and with
her attorney before anything was final. [R. 549]. (This finding of fact is challenged
in Section I of the Argument).

vJ

46.

Importantly, Christensen testified at trial that according to her understanding, the
2013 WUA was not in any way an integrated part of the Offer to Purchase and that
Page 13 of 45

the two documents were not dependent. [TT. 217:10 through 218:23]. Brasher
confirmed in his testimony at trial that approval of the 2013 WUA was not

~

contingent upon Christensen approving the Offer to Purchase. [TT. 137: 16-25].
47.

Christensen allowed Brasher to take the WUA with him when he left. [R. 548].

48.

At the meeting, Brasher delivered a check for $1,290.00 to Christensen,
representing the lease payment for the water shares. [R. 548]. [A copy of the
Check 1212 dated 3/13/13 for the amount of$1,290.00 is attached as Addendum

~]49.

The pnce paid by Brasher for the 2013 lease of the water shares was a
premium/high price. [TT. 79: 17-18].

50.

Brasher filed the WUA with HCIC on March 13th, 2013-the same day that he
met with Christensen and Swasey. [R. 549].

51.

Christensen never cashed the $1,290.00 check for the water shares in 2013. [R.
549].

52.

Christensen never informed Brasher that she hadn't cashed Brasher's check.
However, Brasher was aware that she had not cashed the check because he was
watching his account. Brasher was not concerned because the prior year (2012), it
took Christensen six weeks before she cashed the check for the water use. [TT.
102:5-13; 136:22-25].

53.

Brasher called Christensen at least four times on March 17, both at Christensen's
home number and on Christensen's cell phone. Christensen did not answer so he
left messages on Christensen's cell phone answering service. [R. 549].
Page 14 of 45
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54.

Brasher called Christensen agam on March 21, 2013 at her home; agam,
Christensen did not answer or return the call. [R. 549].

55.

Brasher called Christensen twice on March 24, 2013. Brasher finally reached
Christensen on her home number and spoke with her. During the course of the
call, Brasher expressed his concern that, according to the Offer to Purchase, he
was to take possession of the Farm on March 25, 2013 (the following day).
Specifically, Brasher was worried that Christensen had allowed a neighbor
(Wayne Gordon) to pasture his cows on the property, and that Mr. Gordon needed
some notice that the Farm was being sold and that he would have to move his
cows off the property. [TT. 96: 17 through 97:7].

56.

Brasher testified that each time he called Christensen during March 2013, his
intent was to arrange to drop off the earnest money payment to Christensen. [TT.
113: 19 through 114:2]

57.

Because Mr. Gordon's cows were eating the grass, Brasher wanted to ensure
during the March 24, 2103 call that Christensen had notified Mr. Gordon of the
impending purchase and that Mr. Gordon knew he would need to move his cows
off the property within ten to fourteen days. [TT. 97:4-16].

58.

During the March 24, 2013 phone conversation, however, Brasher learned that
Christensen hadn't ever talked to Mr. Gordon about the impending sale of the
Farm or made arrangements to have Mr. Gordon remove his cows. [TT. 97:19-21].

vJJ

59.

At that point, Brasher believed that the Offer to Purchase was terminated because
the Offer to Purchase indicates that the offer was only open until March, 2013 and
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also because he was to take possession of the Farm on March 25, 2013. [See Offer
to Purchase, Addendum 4].
60.

The Offer to Purchase places the onus on Christensen (as the "Owner") to accept
or reject the offer. [See Offer to Purchase, Addendum 4].

61.

At trial Christensen testified that at the time of the March 24, 2013 phone call, she
had already determined that she was not going to sell the Farm. However,
Christensen also testified that she did not disclose this decision to Brasher, address
the payment of earnest money or mention the 2013 WUA. [TT. 223: 17 through
224:5].

62.

Brasher began drawing water from HCIC under the terms of the 2013 WUA at the
beginning of April, 2013. [R. 549].

63.

Near the end of April, 2013, Christensen's real estate agent, Karen Martino-Basso
contacted Brasher and indicated that Christensen had decided to raise the price of
the Farm $100,000 and keep 100 shares of water. [TT.108:24 through 109:8].

64.

Sometime near the end of April, or the beginning of May 2013, HCIC contacted
Christensen regarding Brasher' s use of her water. [R. 549].

65.

Christensen never contacted Brasher to notify him directly that she was canceling
the WUA. Instead Christensen submitted a Notice of Termination Water Use
Authorization ("Notice of Termination) terminating Brasher's use of the water.
The Notice of Termination was dated May 29, 2013-approximately ten weeks
from the execution and filing of the WUA and approximately two months after
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Brasher had commenced using the water. [A copy of the May 29, 2013 Notice of
Termination is attached as Addendum 6].
66.

The Notice of Termination provides a space for the Water Share Holder and the
"Lessee" of the water to sign. Brasher never signed the Notice of Termination.
[TT. 110:1-3].

67.

Importantly, Christensen referred to the WUA as a "lease" during trial. [TT. 32:7].
Marilyn Rosquist, the secretary/treasurer of HCIC, confirmed that the HCIC
computer system calls the WUA a "lease." [TT. 63:22-25]. Lee McElprang, one of
the members of HCIC's Board of Directors referred to the WUA as a "lease" and a
contract. [TT. 73:15-16] [R. 353]. Allen Staker, chairman of the Board of
Directors at HCIC indicated that he believed the WUA was a binding contract
between the parties [R. 349-350] Brasher referred to the WUA as a "lease." [TT.
82:23 through 83:8; 90:22-23; 91:7].

68.

After Christensen terminated the 2013 WUA, Brasher attempted to rent some
other pasture but none was available. [TT. 127:5-15].

69.

After the termination of Brasher's use of the water, Brasher brought this action,
seeking damages for loss of Brasher's alfalfa crop for the year 2013, and for
damages to his cattle operation extending over the purported life of the 5-year
water lease. [R. 549].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court erred in making certain findings of fact that are directly
contravened in the record and by trial testimony.
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II.

The District Court erred in determining that the WUA, standing alone, does not
establish an enforceable contract or establish that Christensen accepted Brasher's
offer to lease water to Brasher.

III.

The District Court erred in finding that there was no meeting of the minds between
Christensen and Brasher as to the essential elements necessary to form an oral
contract.

IV.

The District Court erred in finding that Brasher's claim for promissory estoppel is
inapplicable because Christensen's promise to allow Brasher to draw water in
2013 was conditioned upon Brasher purchasing the Farm.

V.

The District Court erred in failing to apply the parol evidence rule to certain
extrinsic evidence.

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court erred in making certain findings of fact that are directly
contravened in the record and by trial testimony.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) requires that the party challenging a finding of fact

"must first marshall all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Ultimately,
in order to successfully challenge a finding of fact, the evidence marshaled must be "so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making [the
findings] clearly erroneous." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Wareshouse, 872
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has
recently announced any analysis of the sufficiency of the marshalling requirement should
"be focused on the ultimate question of whether the appellant has established a basis for
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overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings and jury verdictsand not on whether there is a technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default." State

v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I 41,326 P.3d 645.
In order to meet marshalling requirements, Brasher has identified all testimony
and evidence supporting the findings of fact at issue and indicated the nature of the
testimony/evidence, the source of the testimony/evidence, and location of that
testimony/evidence. Below each finding of act, Brasher argues why the finding is against
the clear weight of evidence. On appeal, Brasher challenges the following three findings
~

of fact that are set forth in the District Court's final Order in the case [R. 546-551]. Those
three challenged findings of fact and the location of all supporting testimony/evidence are
as follows:

I.

Brasher filled out the 2013 WUA himself. The terms "payable 3/15 each year"
was not filled in at the March 13th meeting, nor was the term "2018." (R. 548].
( 1)

The only testimony in support of this finding of fact was given at trial by
Christensen's friend, Nedra Swasey, who was present at the March 13,
2013 meeting. Her testimony is as follows:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Now, the water use authorization has some dates on it in the middle
of the page. Do you see those?
Yes, I do.
Do you know who wrote the 2013 number?
Reed would have had to have written out all of it.
Do you recall him doing that while you were there during the
discussion?
All of it was not written out.
Which parts do you recall that weren't written out?
I do not remember, "Payable 3-15 of each year."
Okay. What else?
I also do not remember an ending date. There is no way Vikki would
lease that water for that length of time, ever, to anybody.
And did you have a discussion about an ending date on that --
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A.
Q.

A.
Q.

Yes. Vikki told him it would be on a year-to-year basis.
And do you know -- was that 2018 filled in before or after your
meeting? Do you recall?
I do not believe it was filled in when that paper left her home.
Okay.

[TT. 205: 18 through 206: 19].
(2) There is no specific information in the record concerning this finding of fact.
The District Court's finding of fact that "payable 3/15 each year" was not filled in
at the March 13 meeting, nor was the term "2018" is against the clear weight of evidence
and clearly erroneous. First, Swasey initially stated that she "could not remember" when
initially asked which portions of the 2013 WUA were not completed during the March

~

13, 2013 meeting. Swasey's testimony was that she "did not remember" an ending date of
2018. Swasey then proceeded to justify this remark by arguing that Christensen would
"ever" lease water to anybody for such an extended period of time. With respect to the
term "2018," Swasey said that she did "not believe it was filled in when that paper left
[Christensen's] home." All of these statements are qualified in that Swasey admits she
did not "remember" or that she did not "believe."
Contravening Swasey's testimony is Christensen's own testimony. Christensen
acknowledged that the "payable 3/15 each year" was the date of payment indicated on the
2013 WUA [TT. 22: 18 through 23 :5]. Christensen also admitted during trial that if
Brasher had purchased the property, she should would have rented the water to him for a
"few years." [TT. 32: 12-14].
Brasher testified that during the March 13, 2013 meeting, he left the ending date
for the lease blank, but explained to Christensen why he needed the water for a period of
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years (rather than just one year). [TT. 100:12-23]. Brasher also testified without
qualification that the term "Payable 3-15 of each year" was written in by him and that the
term "2018" was written in by Christensen before he left the March 13, 2013 meeting. [T.
227:4-21]. Brasher also noted that the handwriting of the term "2018" is not consistent
with his writing and that it looked similar to Christensen's writing. 3 [TT. 227: 22 through
228:4]. Brasher affirmatively stated that he witnessed Christensen write the term "2018"
in. [TT. 228:2-7].
Swasey's qualified testimony is unconvincing given the clear and direct testimony
v1

offered by Brasher as to the terms written in the 2013 WUA. It is of significance that
Christensen testified that she intended to lease the water for a period of a "few years."
The handwritten term of "2018" is clearly not the same handwriting that appears in the
rest of the 2013 WU A that was filled out by Brasher and more closely resembles
Christensen's writing. Nothing in the record shows that this issue was even raised until
Swasey was asked about it at trial.
2.

Christensen told Brasher during the March 13, 2013 meeting that the water would
only be leased to him on a year to year basis. [R. 548].
( 1)

(2)

~

\,f>

The only testimony in support of this finding of fact was given at trial by
Christensen's friend, Nedra Swasey, who was present at the March 13,
2013 meeting. See the preceding quote of her testimony. [TT. 205: 18
through 206: 19].
There is no specific information in the record concerning this finding of
fact.

3

Although handwriting experts were not called to testify in this case, it is readily
apparent that the term "2018" as written looks considerably different from the rest of the
handwriting in the 2013 WUA that was written by Brasher.
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As explained in the argument concerning the preceding finding of fact, the District
Court based the finding that Christensen told Brasher that the 2013 WUA was a "year-to-

G;i

year" lease exclusively on Swasey's testimony. However, Christensen acknowledged that
she was willing to enter into a lease for a "few years." Furthermore, Brasher gave
unequivocal testimony that he saw Christensen fill in the term "2018" in the 2013 WUA
while at the March 13 meeting. Swasey's hazy testimony cannot overcome the statements
of Brasher and Christensen. The District Court's finding of fact was against the clear
weight of evidence.
3.

Both parties signed the WUA and the Offer to Purchase but Christensen informed
Brasher that she needed to discuss both offers with her family and with her
attorney before anything was final. [R. 549].
( 1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Christensen testified at trial that Brasher was not supposed to use the water
until she "got back with her to see whether [she] was going to sell it [the
property] or not." [TT. 32:10-16]. 4
Christensen testified at trial that the Offer to Purchase was not a contract
until she went to her family and attorney. [TT. 55:14-18].
Brasher testified at trial that Christensen told him she wanted to speak with
her attorney and family before making accepting the Offer to Purchase.
[TT. 84: 17-25].
Brasher testified at trial that after discussing the Offer to Purchase during
the March 13, 2013 meeting, Christensen indicated that she wanted to
speak with her attorney and family before making accepting the Offer to
Purchase. [TT. 87: 14-24].
Brasher testified at trial that he understood that he was to pay the earnest
money after Christensen spoke to her attorney and family about the Offer to
Purchase. [TT. 90:4-11].
Brasher testified at trial that Christensen would not take the earnest money
until speaking with her family and attorney about the sale of the property.
[TT. 91:3].

4

The discussion Christensen refers to had to do with the sale of the property under the
Offer to Purchase-not a discussion about the 2013 WUA.
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(7)

(8)
(9)

(10)

(11)

Nedra Swasey testified at trial that Christensen kept the Offer to Purchase
after the March 13, 2013 meeting so she could take copies of it to review
with her attorney and family. [TT. 205:10-14].
Christensen signed the Offer to Purchase but stated that she needed to
discuss the offer with her attorney and family before accepting it. [R. 73] 5
Christensen stated that she met with her attorney on March 25, 2013 to
discuss the offer on the Farm. She also discussed the offer with her family
and ultimately decided not to accept the offer. [R. 83].
Christensen stated that she signed the Offer of Purchase, but told Brasher
she needed to discuss it with her attorney and family before accepting it.
[R. 82]. 6
Christensen stated that she met with her attorney on March 25, 2013 to
discuss the offer on the Farm. She also discussed the offer with her family
and ultimately decided not to accept the offer. [R. 83].

The District Court's finding of fact that Christensen notified Brasher that she
needed to discuss both offers (the Offer to Purchase and the 2013 WUA) with her
attorney and her family is against the clear weight of evidence and clearly erroneous
.iJ>

because all testimony and evidence in the record demonstrates that Christensen only ever
discussed taking the Offer to Purchase to her attorney and family. There is no evidence
that Christensen told Brasher that she need to take the 2013 WU A to review with her
attorney and family. In fact, Brasher took the 2013 WUA and filed it the same day after
the March 13, 2013 meeting.
II.

The District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that the WUA, standing
alone, fails to establish an enforceable contract or establish that Christensen
accepted Brasher's offer to lease water to Brasher.
The District Court concluded that "the WUA by itself does not establish an

enforceable contract and it does not establish that Christensen accepted Brasher's offer to
5

Notably, the record shows that Christensen stated that she needed to discuss the "Offer
to Purchase" with her attorney and family before accepting it-not the 2013 WUA.
6
Again, Christensen reviewed the Offer to Purchase with her attorney and family-not
the 2013 WUA.
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least [sic] water to Brasher, as a matter of law." [R. 550]. This District Court based its
legal conclusion on the fact that "[the WUA, by its very terms, conditioned '[i]n
accordance with a lease and/or agreement.' Accordingly, the WUA contemplates that the
parties have reached a separate agreement as to the lease of shares of HCIC stock, and
the WUA instructs HCIC to deliver water to one of the parties for a period of time." [R.
550]. [Emphasis added].
This conclusion is erroneous. Even if the WUA is predicated upon the expectation
that the parties have reached some sort of underlying "agreement" (written or oral), the
WUA meets the legal elements of a "contract."

A.

The WUA, standing alone, meets the requirements for an enforceable
contract.

For either an oral or written contract to be enforceable there must be ( 1) an offer
and acceptance, (2) adequate consideration, and (3) competent parties. See Uhrhahn
Constr. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, 1 12179 P.3d 808.

1. Offer and Acceptance
"An offer is a 'manifestation of willingness' to enter into an agreement, inviting
another to accept. An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an
objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract
has been made. An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms
presented in the offer ... or it is a rejection .... The conduct of both parties may also be
considered in determining whether they entered into an agreement. McKelvey v.
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Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126, 211 P.3d 390 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In the instant case, offer and acceptance are demonstrated by the parties' conduct.
~

More particularly, it is undisputed that Brasher and Christensen met on March 13, 2013,
executed the WUA. Brasher paid Christensen the agreed-upon amount for the lease and
Christensen accepted the payment. Christensen permitted Brasher to leave with the

~

executed WUA and Brasher filed the WUA the same day. A few weeks later Brasher
began calling on the water and used the water for approximately two months before
Christensen terminated his use. The previous year (2012), Christensen had leased the
same number of shares for the same consideration using the exact same WUA form.
2. Adequate Consideration
The formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent to the exchange; and consideration. Furthermore, consideration sufficient
to support the formation of a contract requires that a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for. See Aquagen Int'/, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah
1998). There is no dispute that the check tendered by Brasher to Christensen for
$1,290.00 was adequate consideration.
3. Competent Parties
There is no dispute that Christensen and Brasher were competent parties at the
time the 2013 WUA was executed. [R. 158].
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B.

Additional evidence supports Brasher's position that the WUA is a
contract.

In addition to the fact that the 2013 WUA meets the three elements required to
establish a written contract, additional information supports Brasher's position that the
F\
\/:ii

WU A is a contract.
First, the 2013 WUA and the check paid by Brasher taken together provide: (1)
the names of the parties; (2) a description of the property that is subject of the agreement;
(3) the period/term of the agreement; (4) the signatures/dates of the parties (5) the
authorization required for HCIC to allow Brasher use of the shares; and (6) the price paid
for the shares. Clearly, these elements establish a complete and certain agreement and
represent the final expression of the parties as to the leasing of the 215 water shares.
The District Court concluded that because the 2013 WU A contemplated an
underlying separate "lease" or "other agreement," the WUA itself could not be a
complete contract. This conclusion is neither warranted nor rational. The WUA does not
preclude the possibility of a prior oral agreement between parties. Moreover, it is not
uncommon for parties to have verbal discussions resulting in an oral understanding that is
later memorialized in writing. In the instant case, the parties testified that they met on
March 13, 2013 to discuss Brasher's lease of the water and ultimately executed the 2013
WUA after that discussion. The 2013 WUA is the written culmination of the oral
agreement the parties had. The fact that the parties engaged in a discussion and came to
an understanding concerning the lease of water at the March 13, 2013 meeting does not
mean that the WU A lacks the elements and characteristics of a contract.
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In addition, Christensen referred to the WUA as a "lease" during trial and in her
letter to HCIC terminating Brasher's use [R. 169]. Marilyn Rosquist, the
secretary/treasurer of HCIC, confirmed that the HCIC computer system calls the WUA a
"lease." Lee McElprang, one of the members of HCIC's Board of Directors referred to
the WUA as a "lease" and a "contract. Allen Staker, chairman of the Board of Directors
affirmed that the WU A is a binding "contract" between the parties. Brasher referred to
the WUA as a "lease." While the testimony of these individuals is not dispositive of the
legal issue, it indicates a strong consensus that the WUA is a legally binding document
I.@

between the parties who execute and submit the WUA to HCIC.
This Court should reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that the WUA is
not a contract.

III.

The District Court erred in finding that there was no meeting of the minds
between Christensen and Brasher as to the essential elements necessary to
form an oral contract.
The District Court found that Brasher did not prove the existence of an oral

contract with Christensen as to the leasing of her 215 Class "A" water shares in 2013
because there was no "meeting of the minds." Specifically, the District Court found that
based on evidence presented at trial "Christensen believed the water lease was part of the
Farm sale" and that "Christensen did not intend to lease the water to Brasher unless he
purchased the Farm.... " [R. 550]. [Emphasis added].
The District Court erred by entirely misstating Christensen's own testimony. In
fact, Christensen stated unequivocally that the Offer to Purchase and the WUA were not
dependent on each other; or integrated in any way. Furthermore, the District Court
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ignored the clear weight of evidence and every factual indicia proving that Christensen
did agree to lease the water to Brasher under the terms of the 2013 WUA. The elements
of an oral contract were met, and Brasher and Christensen did have a meeting of the
minds with respect to the lease of the 215 Class A water shares. Furthermore, if this
Court determines that the 2013 WUA is not, standing alone, a contract, it is obvious that
the parties entered into an oral contract. Such an oral contract would meet any ostensible
criteria set forth in the WUA that it be made "[i]n accordance with a lease and/or
agreement."

A.

Christensen testified that the Offer to Purchase and WU A were not
integrated or interdependent on each other.

Christensen unambiguously testified at trial that the 2013 WUA was not in any
way an integrated part of the Offer to Purchase and that the two documents were not
interdependent. Christensen's own attorney questioned her about her understanding of the
relationship between the Offer to Purchase and WU A:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

What was your understanding about this Document [the 2013 WUA]?
Well, it was just -- he was supposed to just hang on until I got -- seen you
and got everything done before I said yes, I'll -- it's a go. And before I done
that, he started using water.
So was it your understanding that this was part of the other agreement?
No.
So you understood them to be separate documents?
Yes.
Was it your understanding that one was dependent on the other? That this
would only take affect if the other one was signed?
No.
Or if the other one went into effect?
No. None of it was supposed to be legal.

[TT. 217:8-25].
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Brasher similarly confirmed that the 2013 WUA was not contingent upon
Christensen approving the Offer to Purchase.
Q.

A.

And she told you at that time that she -- that the water lease was contingent
on her approving your offer.
No, she did not.

[TT. 13 7: 16-25].
The admission by Christensen is directly contrary to the District Court's finding
that "Christensen believed the water lease was part of the Farm sale" and that
"Christensen did not intend to lease the water to Brasher unless he purchased the Farm."
~

It is undisputed that the parties did not condition Brasher's rights to lease the water in
2013 on his purchase of the Farm.
Moreover, according to the Offer to Purchase, the sale included 605.55 shares of
class "A" water and 175 shares of class "B" water-far in excess the 215 class "A"
shares that Brasher leased under the terms of the 2013 WUA. This fact is relevant
because if the 2013 WUA was conditioned upon consummation of the sale under the
terms of the Offer to Purchase, Brasher would not have needed a separate WUA/lease
since he would have had more than enough water merely by purchasing Christensen's
property. In other words, the 2013 WUA would have been an unnecessary redundancy
had the parties actually believed that the two documents were somehow integrated or
interdependent upon each other. There would have been no reason for Christensen to sign
the 2013 WU A or accept payment for the lease of 215 shares if she actually believed that
the sale of the Farm was requisite-because the sale would have resulted in Brasher
receiving an overabundance of water shares. [TT. 45:8 through 46: 14].
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The idea that the 2013 WUA was conditioned on the sale of the Farm is further
belied by the fact that the Offer to Purchase anticipated a closing no later than December
1, 2013. If permission to lease the water was conditioned on the purchase of the Farm by
Brasher, the 2013 WUA would necessarily have been held in abeyance until closing had
actually occurred up to December 1, 2013 thereby rendering the 2013 WUA useless
during the entire 2013 irrigation season. [TT. 50:10 through 51:18].
In addition, the premium payment of $1,290.00 for the 2013 lease of water was
separate from any payment required under the Offer to Purchase. In fact, neither
document references the other in any way.

It is critically important to note that the District Court relied solely upon the upon
the premise that the 2013 WUA was conditioned upon Brasher purchasing the Farm in
ruling that the parties did not have a "meeting of the minds" and that, as a result, no oral
contract was formed. Because the District Court's legal conclusion is clearly erroneous,
this Court should reverse.

B.

The clear weight of evidence and every factual indicia prove that the
parties entered into an oral agreement whereby Christensen was to
lease the water to Brasher and that the oral agreement was represented
in the terms of the written 2013 WUA.

There is no dispute that Brasher believed that he entered into an oral contract to
least the 215 shares in 2013. In keeping with the terms of the 2012 WUA, Brasher offered
to enter into a six (6) year lease for the 215 shares. Thereafter, Christensen's actions
manifest assent in every way to the offer. Plainly, an objective, reasonable person would
be justified in understanding that an oral agreement under these circumstances had been
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reached. Specifically, Christensen openly manifested her acceptance of the offer by: ( 1)
executing the 2013 WUA during the March 13, 2013 meeting; (2) accepting the check
tendered by Brasher for the full lease price; (3) allowing Brasher to leave the meeting
with the 2013 WUA in his possession so Brasher could file the WUA with HCIC; and (4)
holding onto the check and not returning it to Brasher until it was demanded in discovery
during the litigation. These actions patently demonstrate Christensen's accord with the
terms of the 2013 WUA. Based on Christensen's conduct, Brasher reasonably relied and
commenced using the water for approximately two months before Christensen took any
~

action to terminate the 2013 WUA.
As previously noted, the HCIC 2013 WUA form is identical to the 2012 WUA
form. The parties used the exact form document to memorialize their agreement for the
2012 irrigation season. Brasher also paid Christensen the same premium price of $6.00
per share, in the same fashion (i.e. by check made payable to Christensen). The actions
concluding the 2012 agreement are identical with the process the parties followed in 2013
thereby demonstrating the intent of the parties to enter into an agreement concerning the
lease of the 215 water shares.
Of particular importance is the fact that the 2013 WU A incorporates specific
timing for the payment of the valid consideration. Brasher promised to tender payment
for the upcoming irrigation season no later than March 15 th of each year. Additionally,
the payment term is definite as the check tendered by Brasher established the premium
price agreed upon of six dollars ($6.00) per share - the same amount agreed to in 2012.
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In conclusion, the District Court committed reversible error by misstating the
actual understanding and intent of the parties. The 2013 WUA was not conditioned upon
Brasher's purchase of the Farm. The District Court also ignored the overwhelming and
obvious weight of evidence that establishes the parties' oral agreement that culminated in
the execution of the 2013 WUA and tender of payment by Brasher of the lease price to
Christensen.

IV.

The District Court erred in finding that Brasher's claim for promissory
estoppel is inapplicable because Christensen's promise to allow Brasher to
draw water in 2013 was conditioned upon Brasher purchasing the Farm.
The District Court offered only one reason in its "Conclusions of Law" section for

denying Brasher's claim of promissory estoppel: "Christensen's promise to allow Brasher
to draw water in 2013 was conditioned upon [B]rasher purchasing the Farm.
Accordingly, Brasher's claim for promissory estoppel is inapplicable." [R. 550-551]. The
trial court's reasoning is flawed for several reasons.
First, as already addressed in Section III of this brief, both Christensen and
Brasher expressly testified that the WUA was not conditioned upon Brasher purchasing
the Farm. On this basis alone, this Court should reverse the District Court.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Brasher established by the preponderance
of evidence the four elements of promissory estoppel. To prove a cause of action for
promissory estoppel, a plaintiff is required to establish that:
(1) [t]he plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a
promise made by the defendant; (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff
had relied on the promise which the defendant should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the plaintiff or a third person;
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(3) the defendant was aware of all material facts; and (4) the plaintiff relied
on the promise and the reliance resulted in a loss to the plaintiff.
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 1 16, 158 P.3d 1088 (quoting
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100,135,989 P.2d 1077).
All four elements are satisfied in this case. As to the first element of "reasonable
and prudent reliance," both the 2012 WUA and 2013 WUA facially manifest
~

Christensen's agreement that Brasher would have access to least 215 shares of
Defendant's water. Under the terms of the 2012 WUA, Brasher did lease and use the
water as agreed. The 2013 WUA is identical to the 2012 WUA. The 2013 WUA was
executed by the parties at the March 13, 2013 meeting. Furthermore, Brasher tendered
and Christensen accepted the check for $1,290.00 to lease the 215 share (the exact same

lit)

amount Brasher paid in 2012). In reliance on the foregoing, Brasher did not attempt to
secure an alternate water source. In light of the parties' previous 2012 agreement, Brasher
reasonably relied on Christensen's promise to provide Brasher access to the 215 shares in
the 2013 irrigation season. In fact, Brasher immediately filed the 2013 WUA with the
HCIC on March 13, 2013 (the same day it was signed) and used the water for
approximately two months before Christensen terminated his use.
As to the second element requiring defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's reliance,

~

it is undisputed that Brasher relied upon the 2013 WUA and that Brasher specifically
notified Christensen of his serious need to use the water shares to water his crops and
support his cattle during the 2013 irrigation season. Of critical importance is the fact that
Christensen was admittedly aware in late April/early May 2013 that Brasher was using
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the water represented by the 215 shares; and despite this knowledge, Christensen waited
until May 29, 2013 to complete the Notice of Termination.
As to the third element necessary to establish promissory estoppel-it is
undisputed that Christensen was aware of all material facts relevant to the 2013 WUA
and the ramifications of signing the 2013 WUA. Christensen has never argued that she
was unaware of even any material fact relevant to, or associated with the 2013 lease of
the water shares.
With respect to the fourth element-a plaintiff's reliance and damages-the
undisputed testimony at trial was that Christensen, without prior notice to Brasher,
terminated his access to the water shares. As a result, Brasher was unable to obtain
sufficient water for his crops. Consequently, to avoid losing all his crop, Brasher was
forced to focus his remaining water on his alfalfa field and was unable to water his grass
field. As a result, Brasher's grass field died, and Brasher was forced to try and secure
alternative feed for his cows and was ultimately forced to sell off the cows. [TT. 104: 15
through I 07:8].
It is also relevant that Christensen decided prior to the March 24, 2013 telephone
call (although she never informed Brasher of the decision) that she was not going to sell
the Farm to Brasher or accept the earnest money. Even though the Offer to Purchase
indicated that Brasher was to take possession of the Farm on March 25, 2013,
Christensen had not informed Wayne Gordon (at least at the time of the March 24, 2013
telephone call) that Mr. Gordon would need to remove his cows. Furthermore, at the end
of April, 2013, Christensen's real estate agent, Karen Martino-Basso contacted Brasher
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c,
~

and indicated that Christensen had decided to raise the price of the Farm $100,000 and
retain 100 shares of water. The Offer to Purchase required Christensen as the "Owner" to
accept or reject the offer by the end of March, 2013. 7 Christensen did not accept the Offer
to Purchase. Furthermore, as stated previously Christensen failed to notify Brasher of that
decision. Christensen presumably changed her mind at some point about the pricing and
retention of 100 shares after she spoke with her family and/or attorney about the Offer to
Purchase. In any case, Christensen decided to reject the Offer to Purchase-not Brasher.
The District Court's basis for its denial of Brasher's promissory estoppel claim
~

rested solely conclusion that "Christensen's promise to allow Brasher to draw water in
2013 was conditioned upon [B]rasher purchasing the Farm." In reaching this conclusion
the Court entirely ignored the direct testimony of Christensen that the lease of the 215
water shares was not conditioned upon Brasher's purchase of the Farm. Brasher's own
testimony corroborates that such a condition was never discussed or agreed to.
Accordingly, the District Court's legal conclusion is not sustainable and should be
reversed. This Court also has separate grounds for reversal because Brasher has
established every element of his promissory estoppel claim by the necessary
preponderance of the evidence.

7

The Offer to Purchase doesn't list a specific date in March-it only indicates the month
of March. Since no date is indicated, it is reasonable to presume that March, 25 2013 was
the latest day that could have been intended because that was the day upon which Brasher
was to take possession of the Farm
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V.

The District Court erred in failing to apply the parol evidence rule to certain
extrinsic evidence.
Prior to trial, Brasher made a motion in limine based on the parol evidence rule

seeking to preclude Christensen from introducing the Offer to Purchase the Farm, and
any evidence attempting to prove that the 2013 WUA was contingent upon Brasher's
agreement to purchase the Farm. [R. 332-356]. The District Court denied the motion in

limine on grounds that the 2013 WUA was not an "integrated contract" and was not a
"final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." [R. 444-448]. On appeal,
Brasher contends that the District Court committed reversible error in ruling that the
parol evidence rule was inapplicable because the 2013 WUA was not an integrated
contract or a final expression of the parties' agreement.
"As a principle of contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a very
narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence of fraud or other
invalidating

causes,

to

exclude

evidence

of contemporaneous

conversations,

representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of
an integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024,
1026 (Utah 1995) (internal citations omitted).
"Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence is admissible only to clarify
ambiguous terms; it is not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous
terms of the contract. The application of the parol evidence rule is therefore a two-step
process: First, the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the court
finds the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if the court
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makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement is ambiguous."
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 1 11, 182 P.3d 326 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the 2013 WUA and the check constitute writings sufficient to
demonstrate a clearly integrated agreement lacking any ambiguity as to the essential
terms.
A.

The WUA is an integrated contract.

The Utah Supreme Court has defined an "integrated agreement" as "a writing or
@

writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.

To

determine whether a writing is an integration, a court must determine whether the parties
adopted the writing as the final and complete expression of their bargain. Importantly,
we have explained that when parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a
complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of
fraud, that the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the parties." Tangren
Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,

1

12, 182 P.3d 326 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). The 2013 WUA and the $1,290 check together constitute a
final written expression of the terms of the parties' agreement.
The District Court placed great stock in the opening words of the 2013 WUA
which state that the authorization is made [i]n accordance with a lease and/or other
agreement." Specifically, the District Court noted in its conclusions of law that "[t]he
~

WU A contemplates the parties have reached as separate agreement as to the lease of
shares of HCIC stock, and the WUA instructs HCIC to deliver water to one of the parties
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for a period of time." [R. 550]. The District Court understood this prefatory language to
mean that the WUA itself could not be a contract (Brasher discusses this error in Section
II of this Brief). The District Court, however, also ignored the fact that Brasher and
Christensen met on March 13, 2013 to discuss the terms of the lease, executed the 2013
WUA and exchanged consideration for the lease (i.e. the $1,290.00 check). Moreover,
Christensen permitted Brasher to take the 2013 WUA with him when he left. These
actions establish that the parties did have an "agreement" as inferred by the prefatory
language of the 2013 WU A and that the oral agreement and understanding was
memorialized in writing by executing the 2013 WUA.
In sum, the 2013 WUA and the check together provide: (I) the names of the
parties; (2) a description of the property that is subject of the agreement; (3) the
period/term of the agreement; (4) the signatures/dates of the parties (5) the authorization
required for HCIC to allow Brasher use of the shares; and (6) the price paid for the
shares.
These essential elements establish a "complete and certain agreement" and
represent the final expression of the parties as to the leasing of the 215 water shares.
There is no ambiguity as to these essential terms. As previously noted, the 2013 WUA
and Offer to Purchase do not reference each other in any way. There is no writing that
makes the 2013 WUA conditional upon Christensen's acceptance of the Offer to
Purchase or Brasher's purchase of the property.
There is no dispute that the 2013 WUA specifies that Brasher had authorization to
begin calling for water on March 13, 2013 (the "start date"). Because that start date is
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expressly established in the 2013 WUA, it can be conclusively presumed, in the absence
of fraud, to contain the whole agreement as to that term.
With such an unequivocal terms provide in the 2013 WUA and the check issued
by Brasher, the District Court should have concluded these two writings are integrated
and that Brasher had authorization to call upon the 215 share in question.
B.

Parol evidence cannot be introduced to amend the start date of the
WU A because the integrated term is not ambiguous.

"A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 125, 190 P.3d 1269 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
Brasher's interpretation of the 2013 WUA 's start date is the only reasonable
interpretation. Therefore, the start date term is unambiguous and parol evidence cannot
be introduced to alter the term. The District Court should have excluded Christensen
from introducing the Offer to Purchase and other evidence attempting to prove that
Brasher could not begin calling upon water until Christensen had accepted the Offer to
Purchase. See DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 2009 UT App 269,18, 220 P.3d 178 ("The
parol evidence rule operates to exclude extrinsic evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding
to the terms of an integrated contract.") (Internal citations and quotations omitted).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Brasher respectfully request that the Court:
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1.

Reverse the three specified findings of fact by the District Court on grounds of
clear error.

2.

Reverse the District Court 's legal conclusion that the 2013 WUA, standing alone,
is not a contract.

3.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that Christensen and Brasher never
had a "meeting of the minds" suffic ient to form an oral contract.

4.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that promissory estoppel is
inapplicable because Christensen required that Brasher purchase her property in
order for the 2013 WUA to be valid.

5.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that the paro l evidence rule is
inapplicable to evidence related to the alleged "condition" that Brasher was
required to purchase Chri stensen's property in order to for the 2013 WUA to be
effective.
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Addendum 1:

2012 Water Use Authorization

@

....__

HUNTINGTON CLEVELAND IRRIGATION COMPANY
P.O. Box 327

~

HUNTINGTON, UTAH
PHONE (435)687-2505

FAX (435)687-5269

WATER USE AUTllORlZATIQN
In accordance with a lease and/or other agreement, I---.;---t;--.:....·· '_a;...;..;:~.·......-'~---/-~__
;/......
/ ,_,(
___
->.;.....
:~.....
~:l-"'};~,__:l-+-1-~j;;._'•~-~_. _JV
__
~

';

I

am authorizing ,'}.Q_ 2 </'

l,,~) vDu10t
,-, I Q yQ_,
r1

(Print Name)
to call for:

(Print Name)
'l' 15
v,shares of Class A water
------

- - - - - -shares of Class B water
from my Huntington Cleveland Irrigation water account starting at the beginning of

~() / J..

irrigation season

(year)

D To the end of :;tJ /

~

irrigation season

(year)
(Ple~e check appropriate box)

~ Until further notice.

This water has previously been delivered in the_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Canal
and as per this agreement wi11 be delivered in the _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Canal

If the conditions of this agreement change, I will contact the Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company office
and modify, or terminate this agreement.

Lj I /'7

Jd-

(Date)

z,

'•-

(Date)

NOTE: If class-B water is leased, the land it is attached to on the subscription agreement must be leased with it.
Water leases or exchanges after April 1st are subiect to RCIC Board approval and a $20.00 fee.
Plaintiff00004

@)

@

@

Addendum 2:

Check 1073 dated 4/22/12 for the amount of $1,290.00
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Mountain America Online Branch

View Check: #001073

Amount $1,290.00

Date: 5/15/2012

Check Front

Check Back

o,;;

t..

.,.
,..

I

• I

-~

•t

t.

}~ ~ f
. ::,.
...

,.

https://ob.macu.com/U ser/MainTransactions/ViewCheckFrame/6612E9E8B24B47E2AB7...

7/18/2'Jigitiff00005
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Addendum 3:

2013 Water Use Authorization

'
@1
J

. llUNTINGTON CLEVELAN,) IRRIGATION COMPANY
P.O.Box3t1
~ UTAH

.. ~.

PIIONE(435)687-2SOS 1AX(GS)f87-5269

'j
..
. .=

.. •

-~·

......·.:
..·-

I

I

, ;)I
\Sf

,

i

D To 1he end of 2a 1g

imgation season

(year)
(Plcaseohect. app10,z1a1e bBx)

·This---has~~c1uliwmiinthe .

and. per d i s ~ will be delivered in the

D until further notiQ;.
-

···

&,~
&,.t~~

~

-'~

Omal

..

Iftlie Cdnditions of tbisagreenient ~ - I will contact-thoHmdinaton Cleveland Irrigation Company oflice;:_ ·
amt modify~ ortmninate tlns apeement.
·

2·, 1z , ZCP'L
(Date)

-

31/,f,-b/.Y
(Date)
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~
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Addendum 4:

@

March 13, 2013 Offer to Purchase Real Estate

Offer to Purchase Real Estate
ThisOFFERismadeon
Buyer,of il~TCI>
State of

fl?otet!I/

'/?c£6 ~/2/i-~Hcl<.

,by

7,cLlJt..J

Uf;;;J h

Owner, _of

IL~ :2lJlj

,Cityof ,/..fet,:J/Q.-/UtLb-

'who offers to purchase from \/;

J-1 ~ Te b

,

k k; Cl h /2 ~ ze-N:<E N

b tt1c , Pe ,u o 6
,
,the following described real estate, 10:ated at a- 7 € b ·7::,::-u~
lJ:ttJ J.2C J..J~ 15'
, State of LJt...li-/l
- --J~=-----~----

~-LL:>~

Uip A
-------- , City 'of
State of

, City of

ii

71'9ettE.L-#- l)l./-OeJ/t:JL/-Dot) I aAJP B-JDLf7u15

rcJ.Kl!.f:r'l.$ ....

_.t/_7_s-:.....,.·✓_t1_0_ZJ_LJ_,, _ __
0

The following price is offered for the property:

$

~~~~{paidfo!tfe'b'~=-y-with this Offer:

s __

Further deposit to Owner upon signing of Sales Agreement:

$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,~-

Balance due at closing:

$ __

tPc-7

_..""""':5.,.,...,

_0_1._:.,_o_ _ _ __

~___.7_iJ
___D=--IJ_o---1-,,_tJ_o_
$ --~---'12:......s;....__IJ......,.lJ_Q____
' -"~--

Total purchase price:
This Offer is conditioned on the following tenns:

1. This Offer is conditional upon the Buyer being able to arrange a finn commitment for suitable financing on the
following tenns within ninety (90) days of acceptance of this Offer by the Owner:
Mortgage amount:

Term of Mortgage:
Interest rate of Mortgage:

_ _ _ _ monthly payments
_ _ _ _ percent per annum

2. This Offer is conditional upon the Buyer obtaining a satisfactory termite report and upon a satisfactory inspection
of the property by Buyer within ninety (90) days of acceptance of this Offer by the Owner.
3. Property will be sold free and clear of all encumbrances and with good and marketable title.
4. The parties agree to execute a standard Agreement to Sell Real Estate within ninety (90) days of acceptance of this
Offer by the Owner.
5. The closing for this sale shall occur on or before

7i+/IZ
of LI--L~ A
o'clock, at

6.0therterms:

O Olt<..7>

j>c<l /, ~13
,Cityof

P/EftSC 6cc

/2eV6~CC

,at

c'5

p11:3r

{!,as;,,-f/e b)AL<=

, State

&:de~ "]::)o(J_un<..U<:1
*NOVA LF290 Offer to Purchase Real Estate (01-09)

\·

\'

'· .

Plaintiff00056

7. This Offer
shall remain open
12d 1._1 - - o,clock, on
·
. until·fr/a
-----=----=x..L--'--If not accepted
by the Owner by this tlDle,
•
. Offer is rescinded and the deposit
-money
----.
this
shallbe returned.

~~

Owner's Signature

Buyer's Printed Name

Owner's Printed Name

l/4M~a~~

Date Signed

11
~

.,

·-

KcCtS~ ··!,.Jiil--- -774 /ff

pe>sses,·D 10

D-1 -l h,/':i71t/U!\

d.;u.; er/ marc.arl a-013 •
\l,'<l--k;~ 0,-U- ke:&p -Posse.5101-J of +Ae- ;-/oflAc ·
tutxf -!he )-/l)u~c lJJJ ~:::,--1-H

.~ F o"'I \":> ~ra~ a.l'O\l _
if'r0"t~t ":'ad e f~~-\- ~ •S' •
.:t /J?tlU6/l.ll-l. ..f ~Jft<{;,f Oil, 'f3_1tbH7S JN<i.~tJe'b
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1
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U.!O +_r I

AplZ I l- and d-D I l/ ,,
I/'\/ ,;, 2>~ IC JP c!_.u.-1 ,De:.S

'8

~f, p..J2-ES D-1 '1J, /;);zi:J£. /2.
•
\'_
·EL.J11 1?_e;JUY/ IT6 '"
Dt:/S Dt>-1=- , ~ , ~ 7}:'.fllLEi'
/111:&:.£!_ p;i-~11.. ,e_"/1,l.tp ,nV'-JT, 1J
b"i2 PsN lJ z,-lht:f2..
Y11 l>-U) /<.. }-/ 0 m.£.S, 'JSD+rt- 1 ;..J- b.Jhee I £12 -

/ 7 5"",

-t:-,t /e:J d::::e/lL-f.
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Addendum 5:

Check 1212 dated 3/13/13 for the amount of $1,290.00

@

. . . . .. ..
Reed Brasher 08/09
1823 S. Bountiful Blvd

Bountiful, Utah, 84010

1. 2 1. 2
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Addendum 6:

@

May 29, 2013 Notice of Termination

To whom it

may

..
concern:

..

I Vikki Christensen am terminating my lease with Reed Brasher
for 215.00 Shares of Huntington Canal Water as of today

05/20/2013.

v;J/4,· ~Jf-:;v
Vikki Christensen

- ...

-

-
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